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The Other First Philosophy uses to justify the primacy of the science of the divine, KaO6o0 oztoo g 6zt Rpc•frr, universal in this way because first. As famous and, no doubt, as decisive as it might be, this debate should not be allowed to hide another. The universalization of otkoaoo•a sp6(zt becomes the object of a debate only if it first satisfies a previous, still more essential condition: not only is it necessary that the ouafa on which it bears be universalizable or able to universalize its authority but above all such an oaf ia needs to be given. And Aristotle officially posits this condition of first philosophy: Ei 6' i•zt nzt o~ofa dcxvTizog, if there is such an unchanging "is-ness."
This hesitancy obviously should not be understood as a sign of atheism, which would be anachronistic to the point of being a misreading. It can in fact be understood in another way, one that is perhaps foreign to Aristotle but not to our modern, therefore necessarily nihilistic, attitude toward it. What does such an oeia aidvTrl mean for us? I am speaking about neither the existence of such an entity nor its unchanging (therefore divine) quality, but simply its characteristic as oafia, therefore-following the translations introduced by metaphysical usage-its characteristic as substance or essence. Now the concept "substance" has been subject to the Cartesian (and already the medieval) criticism according to which substance remains for us unknown as such, if not in terms of its epistemological dependence on its attributes and its accidents. It has also been subject to the criticisms of Hume and Kant, who admit it only as a function of the understanding, therefore by limiting its validity to phenomena alone-that is to say, precisely to what, for Aristotle, it should surpass. As a result, Nietzsche had to dismiss it at the same time as he smashed all the other metaphysical idols. Should one try to avoid this aporia by understanding o'afia as an essence? But what is left today (after the arguments of Descartes, Kant, and Nietzsche, but also of Wittgenstein) of the notion of essence, except, in the best of cases, the definition of what a being is, therefore what we know about it with the utmost of certainty, that is to say with a knowledge of the being not as it is but as it is known, which is precisely what Aristotle claimed to overcome by acceding to an oao•a? I therefore conclude that a justification of first philosophy on the basis of the fact that it studies an o'afia seems weak not only because it claims to bear on something unchanging and separate (divine), but quite simply because it admits that such an instance can, as such (simply as oa•ia), be defined and understood and therefore qualify a primacy.
One has good reason to object that the real institution of the notion 
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standing," he is ratifying the passage to a primacy of knowledge;6 but, in fact, he also retrieves the very definition of ontologia that he believes he has cast into ruins. That is, Johannes Clauberg, who definitively introduced the term into metaphysics, justifies the privileged object of the new science-the intelligibile rather than the aliquid, or substance-by the argument that one must begin "universal philosophy with cognizable being, just as first philosophy, beginning with the singular, considers nothing before cognizing thought."7 Noetic primacy thus allows not only for first philosophy to be regrounded, but also for ontology, or rather the science of the knowledge of beings in general, to be reattached to it. It is immediately evident that this transfer and this enlargement of primacy to the single noetic instance rest entirely on the primacy of the I. But that the I can ground itself in a manner that is radical enough to secure with its primacy that of first philosophy, this is precisely what philosophy has never ceased, since the advent of nihilism, to put into question. Two major arguments effect this crisis. 
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The empirical ego is limited to repeating the thinkable, without ever drawing from it even the least bit of primacy, neither ontic nor noetic primacy. It is thought in me, who officiates behind the scenes, without initiating or mastering the thought. Let us not dwell on this argument, which is as much Nietzsche's as Foucault's; it has been endlessly reproduced by the "human sciences" and the ideologies attached thereto. These few reflections will be enough to at least pose the inevitable conclusion: none of the types of primacy that metaphysics can propose assures, today and for us, the legitimacy of any first philosophy whatsoever.
Phenomenology as the Possibility of Another First Philosophy
This conclusion nevertheless did not stop Husserl from claiming the traditional title "first philosophy" for phenomenology. The famous course of 1923-24 that bears this title explains it from the outset: "If I am assuming the expression forged by Aristotle, this is only because I take advantage of and profit from the fact that it has fallen into disuse and no longer evokes for us anything but its strictly literal meaning and not the numerous varied sediments deposited by historical tradition which mix confusedly under the vague concept of metaphysics souvenirs from the different metaphysical systems of the past." What a strange argument: it is precisely because not one of its real actualizations (philosophia prima, tkooaotfa npur)j) has been retained that the principle of a first philosophy is maintained all the more, this first philosophy being redefined quite formally as a "scientific discipline of the beginning." How is this to be understood? Perhaps by the completely equivocal nature of the phrase? But Husserl immediately dismisses this hypothesis by claiming that "with the breakthrough made by the new transcendental phenomenology, a first version of the breakthrough toward a real and authenticfirstphilosophy was accomplished."8 In short, phenomenology resumes (or claims to resume) the project of first philosophy and is thus constituted as the philosophy by which one must make a beginning so as to then put into operation second philosophies or regional sciences. There is a second hypothesis: the unequivocal revival of this science escapes metaphysical aporiae (o?ioafa, causa, subjectivity) because phenomenology itself does not belong to metaphysics. This claim, too, remains to be justified; for it is not at all self-evident. But didn't Heidegger, who, more than any other, tried to disentangle phenomenology from metaphysics, also give up a claim to the title "first philosophy"? And if Levinas brought to the fore the doubtfulness of ontology's claim to fundamentality, he did not carry to the end his own claim to the title "first philosophy," nor did he impose its renewal.9 It therefore falls to us to confirm this rupture so as to then try clarifying the meaning and the import of another sense of "first philosophy." To this end, we will proceed in four steps: (1) the principle of phenomenology; (2) the recourse to givenness in its relation to reduction; (3) removing the objections to the intelligibility of givenness; (4) the faultless primacy of givenness. Determining the principle of phenomenology can seem, at first glance, all too easy, as the formulations Husserl used to reach it are so numerous. But this very proliferation should also trouble us. A single formulation would be enough for a principle to be first; several formulations, on the other hand, muddle primacy. Let us therefore quickly review the three formulations used by Husserl. The first, "so much appearing, so much Being,"'• harbors an obvious metaphysical originfirst because it comes from Johann Friedrich Herbart (1806), and especially because it uses the pair appearing/Being, whose perfectly metaphysical arrangement it merely reverses (like Nietzsche, too, at times), without explaining why and how this operation is brought about, namely, by the reduction. The second formulation, "Back to the things themselves!"" suffers from a twofold imprecision concerning first the identity of these things (empirical reality or the "matters at stake"?) and next the inverting operation that would allow this return. In short, in both cases the reduction is always missing, and without it the slogan quickly falls into atheoretical cynicism, a misology. As for the third formulation, which is the sole one qualified as the "principle of principles" and the sole one invented as it suspends precisely the transcendencies that weaken it. If philosophy is deployed in immanence (which is often claimed and can sometimes be claimed with good reason), then phenomenology, following the principle "so much reduction, so much givenness," is even more deserving of the title philosophy. The intimate intertwining of reduction and givenness therefore defines the principle of phenomenology. What appears gives itself, that is to say, it appears without anything being held back or left over. It therefore comes forward, arrives, and sets itself up as such, not as the appearance or the representative of an absent or hidden in-itself, but as itself, in person and in the flesh. What appears pours itself out, so to speak, totally (with its "is-ness," its substantial background, its material individuation, and so forth), to the point that it passes from the rank of image, from the simple appearing or orphaned appearance, to that of the unique thing at stake. And if the phenomenon did not give itself as such, it would remain simply Being's other. But just how does it succeed in giving itself and not remaining the simple image of itself without itself? Because the reduction eliminates from the flow of appearing all that does not give itself unreservedly: the seemings and the confusions, the imaginings or the memories of the given, all connected to transcendencies that confuse the lived experience (in certain cases intentional) with the object intended (by definition only outlined), are spotted, filtered out, and finally separated from the remaining given. The reduction therefore must control givenness, reconduct it to its given core (or noematic core). Thus, strictly in the degree to which the reduction is correctly carried out, it becomes "absurd" (as Husserl says) to suppose that givenness does not give the given certainly. And it follows that the given of givenness suffers no doubt.
Is this a repetition of the unconditional certainty of the ego sum, ego existo? Despite the acquired habit (dating back to Husserl himself) of comparing them, we will insist first on what distinguishes them. According to Descartes, the absolute certainty of this first truth concerns quite precisely nothing but the field where thought returns to itself, more exactly its "autoaffection." But, and the difficulty in subsequently winning other truths will confirm this, autoaffection remains essentially trapped within a real solipsism, of the thing gained (res cogitans) to the other thing, inaccessible or almost so (God and the world perhaps, the other assuredly). According to phenomenology, absolute certainty resides in the affection of consciousness by lived experiences of all sorts (not only, nor even especially, by the thought of self), on the express condition, however, that these lived experiences accomplish a givenness-that they abandon themselves and in certain cases that they also engage the intentional objects at issue. It is therefore every lived experience (and in certain cases the intentional object) that, if it is given by a reduction, is confirmed absolutely. Put otherwise, phenomenology universalizes the Cartesian result. It does not secure the ego alone and to itself; it certifies an entire world 794
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The Other First Philosophy because it no longer bases it on thought (thinking itself), but on the given such as it gives itself (to consciousness). To be sure, this displacement would fall back into empiricism if the intentional given of the lived experience did not align itself with the reduction, if therefore it did not give itself in a reduced immanence. Thus, the given phenomenon also includes, with the experience of its givenness, the experience of its certainty. One cannot doubt a given, for either one considers it precisely as given and, whatever its mode of givenness might be (sensible intuition, imagination, gaze on essences, categorical intuition, and so forth), it will indeed be given, or else one discovers a deception, and that simply tells us that, by error ( Givenness is never suspended, even if and precisely because it admits an indefinite number of degrees. Once again, there can be indefinite degrees to givenness, but there is no exception. Givenness is therefore set up, by its certainty and its universality, as an unconditional principle. There thus could be a first philosophy according to phenomenology.
Givenness as Last Principle
This hypothesis runs up against a few objections, however.'4 The chief of these concerns the relation of the given to givenness. One can say in opposition that it reestablishes a gap between cause and effect, thus opening the field to the theological interpretation of this same cause: Doesn't God come up in revealed theology and the onto-theo-logical tradition (which, for what it's worth, it is best not to always confuse) as the cause of beings who are his effects and possibly as the giver giving his givens? This unnuanced objection, however, does not stand up long under investigation, not only because causality applied to God remains, at least in revealed theology, such that no reciprocity renders it intelligible in terms of its effects (God is known only as unknown) but also because the givenness evoked here belongs to phenomenology alone, therefore depends on the reduction in its particular certainty-which is to say that it brackets all transcendence, including that of God. It would also still need to be shown conceptually that God, according to revealed theology (which is not at issue here, anyway), falls into the domain of transcendence and not more essentially into that of radical immanence-in the figure of the "interior intimo meo."'5 But this objection can also be understood in a more sophisticated way, and one can ask why I continue to translate-since the term goes back to Husserl-Gegebenheit by the French donation (rendered in English as "givenness"), seeing as donation I have to resolve, to which I must at least respond, precisely because I have not chosen it, nor foreseen it or constituted it from the outset. This given gives itself to me because it imposes itself, summons me, and determines me-in short, because I am not the author of it. The given deserves its name on account of its being a fait accompli, such as it befalls me. In this way, it is distinguished from every foreseen, synthesized, and constituted object, since it comes over me as an event. This unforeseen arrival marks it as given and attests to the givenness in it. Givenness does not so much indicate the origin of the given as its phenomenological status. Better, givenness most often characterizes the given as without cause, origin, and identifiable antecedent, far from assigning one to it. And it is enough that the given-the given phenomenon-give itself on its own basis (and not on the basis of a foreseeing and constituting subject) for the fold of givenness to be attested. The objection thus veers toward the confirmation of our thesis: givenness does not submit the given to a transcendent condition, it frees it from one. Now it finally becomes possible to conceive how, in terms of givenness, phenomenology allows us to take up anew the question of a first philosophy. It authorizes it, but with several precautions. For if one expects of a first philosophy that it determine what it brings to light by fixing a priori a principle or a collection of principles, in particular by imposing the transcendental anteriority of the I (or something equivalent), then phenomenology does not achieve and, above all, no longer even claims the rank of a first philosophy thus understood. For as we have reconstructed it, the decisive originality of its enterprise consists in rendering an incontestable priority to the phenomenon: letting it appear no longer as it ought (in terms of the supposedly a priori conditions of experience and its objects) but as it gives itself (from itself and in as much as itself). To imagine that the reduction still imposes a prior condition to
